Developing countries in the WTO: support or resist the 'millennium' round?
E ric Neumayer
W hen mem bers of the W orld Trade Organisation (W TO) gather for their ministerial m eeting in Seattle from 30 Novem ber to 3 December 1999 , the m ost fundamental question for them to decide is whether to launch a new, so-called`m illennium' round of trade negotiations. The developed countries are all in favour, the m ost explicit and vocal supporters being the European Union (EU) and Japan. The developing countries are split: while most Latin Am erican and some Asian countries support a new round, the majority of African and Asian countriesÐ m ost notably Egypt, Zimbabwe, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and M alaysiaÐ are opposed. This opposition is shared by many developm ent NGOs, som e of which are indeed outspoken critics of virtually any form of m arket opening in developing countries (see, for example, Khor 1999) .
Those opposed to a new round of trade negotiations argue that the earlier Uruguay round has been unbalanced in its bene® cial effects for W TO m ember countries. The developed countries, it is argued, have bene® ted quite substantially from including topics in the agreem ent that they favour: intellectual property rights, services, telecomm unications, restriction of production and export subsidies, increased access to developing countries' markets, to m ention just a few. The developing countries, on the other hand, are said hardly, if at all, to have bene® ted from trade liberalisation that transformed the General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the W TO. Opponen ts of a new round of trade negotiations therefore dem and that the old Uruguay agreement be re-negotiated and rebalanced and that no new item s be put on the agenda. This Viewpoint paper will argue that, while the critics are right to a great extent in m aintaining that developing countries have not bene® ted as m uch from the Uruguay round as they should have, it is in their best interest to support rather than resist a new round of trade negotiations as this represents their only chance to get their fair share of bene® ts out of the international trade regim e.
How do developing countries currently fare in the W TO? On paper they are privileged. The W TO agreements of the Uruguay round guarantee them`special and differential' treatment (W TO 1999). Developed countries are encouraged to grant developing countries trade preferences and a number of W TO agreements contain special provisions that are supposed to safeguard developing countries' interests. For example, in the Agreem ent on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), the preparation and application of technical regulations and standards is supposed to take into account the special needs of developing countries. The same applies to measures taken in pursuance of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Furtherm ore, most of the W TO agreements allow developing countries a transitional period of grace until the provisions must be implemented. For exam ple, in the Agreem ent on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, developing countries were given eight years to phase out the relevant subsidies, and a num ber of least developed countries and other developing countries with an annual per capita incom e of less than Developing countries in the W TO US$1,00 0 were totally exempted from the prohibition of export subsidies. Lastly, a couple of W TO agreements envisaged the provision of trade-related technical assistance to developing countries either by developed countries on a bilateral basis or through multilateral institutions.
Developing countries welcomed their special and differential treatm ent' at the time of conclusion of the W TO agreements, but have now grow n disillusioned about their actual effects. They rightly complain that the special provisions that were supposed to safeguard their interests have been largely ineffectual in reality, that the transitional tim e periods were too short for them to adjust to the requirements of the W TO agreements, and that the promised technical assistance was too little and too unsystematic to strengthen their capacity to comply with trade obligations. In a high-level symposium on trade and developm ent held by the W TO in Geneva on 17±18 March 1999 , developing countries were united in their suggestion that, by and large,`special and differential treatment' has proved to be à dead letter ' (ICT SD 1999) . This does not m ean, however, that developing countries have not bene® ted at all from the Uruguay round. Substantial gains have already arisen and are boun d to rise further over tim e due to the gradual phasing in of agriculture and textiles into the W TO for which developing countries have a clear com parative advantage. They have also bene® ted from a further clari® cation and formalisation of dispute settlem ent rules, including som e special provisions for developing countries, such as participation of a panelist from a developing country upon a developing country' s request and provision of quali® ed legal assistance to developing countries. This has led to increased participation from a broader range of developing countries that are trying to defend their trade rights, whereas the form er GATT dispute settlem ent was mostly invoked only by large developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, and India (Kuruvila Pretty 1997). It is encouraging to see that an Advisory Centre on W TO Law, which will provide legal expertise and training to developing countries, is now supported by enoug h W TO member countries to make its full establishment by the end of 1999 likely (BRIDGES 1999a) . Very poor countries especially have always dem anded this legal assistance to help them realise their rights.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the developed countries have bene® ted much m ore than have developing countries from the Uruguay round, a conclusion that was tentatively accepted even by outgoing W TO Director-General Renato Ruggiero (ICTSD 1999) . Given this imbalance, it is easy to understand why India and other developing countries want to resist a new trade round and want m erely to re-negotiate existing agreements in their favour. But is this a viable political strategy? Probably not. W hy should the developed countries make any concessions if any bene® t to them is autom atically excluded by banning from the agenda all issues such as investm ent, competition policy, and government procurem ent in which they have a special interest? Only if the developing countries constructively, but critically, support a new comprehensive trade round will they also be able to push for provisions that are favourable to them. These can either consist of a recti® cation of existing agreements or the negotiation of new provisions. Developing countries should push for the rem oval of persisting impediments to market access for good s in which they have a particular export interest such as agriculture, textiles, leather, clothes, and footwear. These im pediments exist in the form of escalating tariffs, which discourage the manufacturing and processing of raw materials in developing countries, tariff peaks, and non-tariff barriers. They should also push for restrictions on the use of so-called anti-dum ping actions by developed countries that are often protectionist m easures in disguise; and press for openness, certainty, and transparency on the use of environmental m easures for restricting m arket access, especially in the form of eco-labelling' .
The chances that the developing countries m ight be able to secure substantial bene® ts for them selves in a new trade round are not too bad. For example, with regard to agriculture, developing countries can count in m any aspects on the US A to press for reduced subsidies in the EU, Japan, and other highly protectionist countries, while keeping protection in those countries which cannot afford to import food in tim es of crisis. The US representative at the March 1999 symposium also assured developing countries that the USA would be willing to consider increased m arket access for developing countries' industrial good s (ICTSD 1999:3) . Sim ilarly, the developed countries seem to be open towards considering duty-free market access for exports from the least developed countries, even at an early stage of a new trade round , and also towards further debt relief packages, even if these are not strictly within the scope of the W TO. Certainly, a new comprehensive trade round with a multitude of potential new obligations would further increase the pressure on the limited institutional capacity of developing countries to comply with these obligations. On the other hand, because developed countries are aware of this, a new round m ight provide a uniqu e chance to push through comm itments for effectual, substantial, and systematic assistance for capacity building and technology transfer.
The developing countries should seize the opportunity to signal to the industrialised countries that they are willing to support a new comprehensive round of trade negotiations, but only under certain conditions. Only such constructive, but critical, support m akes a re-balancing of the bene® ts from the Uruguay round possible and a realisation of further bene® ts likely. An attitude of total resistance will not rectify any past imbalances and will prove a self-defeating strategy in the long run. W hat is im portant, however, is that alongside such negotiations, which are expected to run over several years, there should be a comprehensive assessment of the social and economic effects on developing countries of the Uruguay trade round and of the likely effects of any new negotiations, to include an environm ental and gender analysis. Such an assessm ent is the only way to establish which provisions are m ost in need of recti® cation and where substantial improvements are required. The W TO secretariat is currently preparing a paper on the review of`special and differential treatm ent' provisions (BRIDGES 1999b). But this can only am ount to a ® rst step towards a comprehensive assessm ent that looks at the full socioeconomic dim ensions. Developing countries and developm ent NGOs like Oxfam and the International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA) should close ranks and do their best to see that the new`millennium ' round of trade negotiations gives the poor and disadvantaged of this world their fair share of the bene® ts of the international trade regime. (1999a) 
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Introduction
As the sun rises, Yolanda is already awake and workingÐ carrying water from a nearby well, cooking breakfast over an open ® re, and cleaning the one-room home that she and her husband built out of cardboard, wood, and tin. She puts on her blue company jacket and boards the school bus that will take her and her neighbour s across Piedras Negras to a large assembly plant. Yolanda and 800 co-workers each earn US$25±35 a week for 48 hours' work, sewing clothing for a New York-based corporation that sub-contracts for Eddie Bauer, Joe Boxer, and other US brands. These wages will buy less than half of their fam ilies' basic needs. Consum ers in the USA , however, will pay two to four tim es Yolanda' s weekly salary to buy the garm ents she sews.
Thirty years ago, Piedgras Negras was a quiet border town. Today, the city churns out clothing, car parts, and other products, along with m illions of gallons of industrial pollution each year. Approximately one million Mexicans now work in over 4,000 maquiladoras (assem bly plants) on the border since the North Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent (NAFT A) was agreed. The plants are ow ned by foreign corporations or sub-contracted by them to produce parts or do`® nal assem bly' of products for export. Mexico' s maquila industry produces textiles, electronics, furniture, chem ical and petroleum products, car parts, processed food, toys, and leather goods. W hile products vary from plant to plant, violations of workers' human, labour, and health rights are consistentÐ a tragic but logical byproduct of`free trade' . As more export processing zones (EP Zs) are established around the world, a grow ing num ber of workers will ® nd themselves in the position of Mexican maquiladora workers.
Corporations pro t while communities deterioriate
Many governments in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Paci® c and Caribbean islands see EPZ s as their best opportunity to attract new jobs. EPZ s are intentionally located where labour is cheap and plentiful, often drawing workers who have lost land or jobs elsewhere. Governm ents offer substantial tax breaks to foreign corporations, sweetening the deal with loose environm ental regulations and active repression of unions. On the Mexican border, for example, US corporations have been exem pt since 1965 not only from taxes on raw materials they bring into Mexico, but also from legally mandated pro® t-sharing provisions. As the ® nal products are exported, prim arily to the USA ,
